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THIS IS OUR HOUSE! – THE TAX MAN 





On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (TCJA).1  The TCJA marks the most comprehensive revolution to the 
U.S. Tax Code since Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986.2  As  
taxpayers begin to calculate the impact of the TCJA on their forthcoming  
Individual Income Tax Returns, businesses, employers, and higher educational 
institutions must evaluate the tremor that this law could have on their bottom 
lines. 
As part of its sweeping overhaul, the TCJA directly targets reform  
applicable to tax-exempt organizations, including the majority of U.S. colleges 
and universities.  The speed at which the TCJA came to fruition, without due 
Congressional or public deliberation, ignited swift criticism in academic  
literature and news commentary.3  Numerous mistakes and ambiguities have 
been noted in the final legislation, prompting trade groups to request Treasury 
guidance.4  Subsequently, the Treasury issued Notice 2018-43, inviting public  
 
* J.D., LL.M. (taxation), Assistant Professor, School of Accountancy, College of Business, Clemson  
University.  
1. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017-2018).  
2. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).  
3. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, A Taxonomy For Tax Loopholes, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 580 (2018)  
(quoting critics of the TCJA who argue that the law was signed with “reckless speed”); Victor Fleischer, The 
State of America’s Tax Institutions, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (2018) (noting the surprise tax bill that 
turned into “must pass” legislation following President Trump’s election); and Norman Lencz, First Look at 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, CPA J. (May 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/05/21/first-look-at-the-tax-
cuts-and-jobs-act-4/ (noting the magnitude of unanswered questions regarding the applicability of the new 
TCJA rules given the speed at which the legislation was passed). 
4. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Comments Regarding Regulatory Guidance Under Public Law No. 115-97, 
U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.uschamber.com/comment/us-chamber-comments-regard-
ing-regulatory-guidance-under-public-law-no-115-97; Request for Immediate Guidance Regarding IRC  
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recommendations for consideration in the 2018-19 Priority Guidance Plan 
which includes a specific focus on the TCJA.5  This recent invitation prompted 
immediate response.6   
Changes embedded in the TCJA that affect higher education include  
imposing a 21% excise tax on salaries paid in excess of $1 million to the five 
highest compensated employees, imposing a 1.4% excise tax on the net  
investment income of applicable educational institutions, and eliminating the 
tax provision allowing donors to take an 80% charitable deduction on  
contributions that include a right to purchase college athletic seating.7  Although 
these changes could result in new tax burdens on any U.S. institution of higher 
education, the college sports arena took a direct tax hit for the first time in almost 
thirty years.8 
Prior to 2018, college athletics had historically enjoyed favorable federal 
tax treatment due to the tax-exempt status of universities, athletic departments, 
and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).9  In 1976, Congress 
declared the fostering of “national or international amateur sports competition” 
as a charitable purpose.10  In conjunction, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
 
Section 199A – Deduction for Qualified Business Income of Pass-Through Entities (Pub. L. No. 115-97, Sec. 
11011), AM. INST. CPAS (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/advocacy/tax/down-
loadabledocuments/20180221-aicpa-sec-99a-qbi-comment-letter-faq.pdf; Request for Guidance on  
Questions Raised by New Tax Law, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (May 1, 2018), https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-
05/180501-cl-aha-office-tax-policy.pdf. 
5. See Public Comment Invited on Recommendations for 2018-2019 Priority Guidance Plan, I.R.S., 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-18-43.pdf (last visited May 9, 2019) (Notice 2018-43).  
6. See, e.g., Recommendation for 2018-19 Guidance Priority List (Notice 2018-43), AM. INST. CPAS 
(June 14, 2018), https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/advocacy/tax/downloadabledocuments/20180614-
aicpa-2018-2019-priority-guidance-plan-list.pdf; Recommendations for 2018-2019 Priority Guidance Plan 
(Notice 2018-43), NAT’L BUS. AVIATION ASS’N (June 13, 2018), https://nbaa.org/wp-content/uploads/advo-
cacy/letters/20180613-NBAA-2018-2019-Priority-Guidance-Request-IRS.pdf; Second Set of  
Recommendations for 2018-2019 Priority Guidance Plan, A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/taxation/policy/061518comments.authcheck-
dam.pdf; SIFMA Recommendations for 2018-2019 Guidance Plan, SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N (July 
16, 2018), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SIFMA-Recommendations-for-2018-2019-
Priority-Guidance-Plan.pdf. 
7. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. §§ 13702, 4960, 4968, 13704 (2017-2018).  
8. In 1991 the IRS issued a technical advice memorandum imposing a UBIT on corporate title  
sponsorship payments to college football bowl games.  See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 
1991) (referred to as the “Mobil Cotton Bowl Letter”). 
9. See Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of College Athletics, 1 
UTAH L. REV. 35, 51 (1987) (noting that college sports hold an “exalted tax position”); see also William A. 
Drennan, Taxing Commercial Sponsorships of College Athletics: A Balanced Proposal, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 
1353, 1373 (2012) (documenting that tax law has treated nonprofit athletic organizations and college athletic 
programs as integral parts of the tax-exempt college).  
10. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1730 (1976) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2017)).  
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has been reluctant to impose income taxes on student-athletes’ athletic  
scholarships (formally referred to as grants-in-aid).11  Although the IRS has 
twice attempted to impose taxes on college sports with respect to radio and 
broadcasting rights and corporate sponsorships, such efforts were met with  
intense public distain and ultimately redacted.12   
The signing of the TCJA into law indicates that Congress is now targeting 
certain areas of higher education, including the college sports arena, for tax  
purposes.13  While public reaction previously influenced the IRS’s decisions to 
redact the agency’s efforts to tax college sports, the TCJA may not so swiftly or 
easily be thwarted.14  Amid mounting legal issues currently enveloping college 
athletics,15 higher educational institutions must prepare for the financial impact 
that the TCJA could have on their athletic programs moving forward.  The  
purpose of this Article, then, is to: (II) provide a history of the big business of 
college sports and early efforts to impose federal taxation on the industry; (III) 
review the applicable TCJA sections that may have a direct or indirect effect on 
U.S. college athletics; and (IV) conclude that universities and their athletic  
departments must begin to account for and strategize plans to protect themselves 
from the financial impact of the TCJA. 
II. A HISTORY OF THE BUSINESS AND TAX TREATMENT OF COLLEGE SPORTS 
College sports have become a pervasive presence in U.S. higher education 
since the mid-nineteenth century when Harvard University competed against 
Yale University in the first intercollegiate crew competition.16  Even during the 
earliest years of unregulated competitive sports, universities grappled with  
intense pressures to be competitively victorious, remain amateur amidst  
 
11. See Gary C. Randall, Athletic Scholarships and Taxes: Or a Touchdown in Taxes, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 
297, 299 (1972); see also Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, The Claim Game: Analyzing the Tax 
Implications of Student-Athlete Insurance Policy Payouts, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L. J. 231, 269 
(2018). 
12. See Nathan Wirtschafter, Comment, Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate  
Sponsorship Game, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1465, 1472-73 (1994) and accompanying footnotes; see also I.R.S. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007. 
13. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 271. 
14. There is currently no proposed legislation in either the House or Senate to amend the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act as it relates to the college sports arena. 
15. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (per the U.S. Supreme Court, 
states may now legalize sports gambling); see also In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic  
Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No 4:14-m-02541-CW  (N.D. Cal. 2018) (challenging the NCAA’s practice 
of student-athlete scholarship capping). 
16. See John R. Thelin & Jason R. Edwards, College Athletics – History of Athletics in U.S. College and 
Universities, STATEU., http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1846/College-Athletics-HISTORY-
ATHLETICS-IN-U-S-COLLEGES-UNIVERSITIES.html (last visited May 9, 2019). 
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pressures to commercialize college athletics, and maintain the highest levels of 
safety and fairness.17  Concerns surrounding the dangers of college football 
prompted then-President Theodore Roosevelt to meet with representatives from 
Yale, Harvard, Princeton University, and other football schools over a century 
ago.18  Following that meeting, reformation and regulation of college sports  
began to take shape with the establishment of the NCAA.19 
Early sports competition between colleges and universities were bolstered 
by fierce rivalries and strong traditions.20  From its inception in 1906, the NCAA 
pronounced that college sports were to be grounded on the bedrock principle of 
amateurism.21  This basic tenant was later fueled by the NCAA’s crafting of the 
term “student-athlete” in an effort to curb early workers’ compensation claims 
by injured college athletes against their universities.22  However, scholars have 
argued that the primordial student-before-athlete model fails to recognize the 
evolving financial forces backing modern day college athletics, prompting  
amateur athletics to morph into what is now a big business in the U.S.23 
 
17. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000).  
18. Kristen R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of Amateurism, 
13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257 (2003) (the meeting between President Roosevelt and university  
representatives took place in 1905). 
19. See Jeff Wallenfeldt, National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Collegiate-Athletic-Association (last visited May 9, 2019).  The 
NCAA formed in 1906 under the name Intercollegiate Athletic Association; the agency later adopted its  
current name in 1910.  Id. 
20. See Danny Flynn, 100 Best Traditions in College Football, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1334063-the-100-best-traditions-in-college-football. 
21. See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism (last visited May 
9, 2019). 
22. See The Editorial Board, Opinion, The O’Bannon Ruling: ‘Student-Athlete’ Is History, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/opinion/the-obannon-ruling-student-athlete-is-his-
tory.html.  See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953); see also Univ. of Denver v. 
Indus. Commission of Colorado, 335 P.2d 292 (Colo. 1959) (holding that private agreements may neither 
violate public policy nor abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public policy of the state. 
Nemeth, whose compensation had been awarded incrementally and who asked for additional workers’  
compensation due to a change in his condition, was granted a reopening of his case.); State Compensation 
Ins. Fund v. Indus. Commission, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (denying benefits to the widow of a  
student-athlete killed during a football game). 
23. See Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25 
RUTGERS L.J. 269, 278 (1994).  Academic scholars have questioned whether student-athletes are actually 
students who participate in sports, or instead athletes that go to class when their athletic schedules allow for 
it due to the exploitation of student-athletes by college athletics programs.  See, e.g., Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, 
Analyzing the Applicability of IRC § 162 on the Pay-for-Play Model, 16 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 190, 191 
(2017) (analyzing the salient identity of the student-athlete in college sports); Jason Gurdus, Note, Protection 
Off of the Playing Field: Student Athletes Should be Considered University Employees for Purposes of  
Workers’ Compensation, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 929 (2001) (concluding that student-athletes are arguably 
employees of the institutions they play for); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth 
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A. The Big Business of College Sports 
Long-gone is the NCAA’s earliest “tradition” of amateurism in college 
sports.  Today, college football and basketball programs are a big business.24  
Boosters and alumni donate millions of dollars to bolster the athletic programs 
of their alma maters.25  In 2015, the Council for Aid to Education documented 
that college athletic departments raised over $1 billion in donations that year.26  
Alumni contributions, combined with ticket sales, branding, television, radio, 
and Internet broadcasting rights, endorse significant revenue earnings for elite 
college sports programs.27  Following its win at the 2016-17 College Football 
National Championship, for example, Clemson University unveiled its  
completed $55 million football complex just in time for the 2018 National  
Signing Day.28  Similarly, in 2017 the University of Kansas announced a $350 
million dollar athletics facility campaign, with a Jayhawks alumnus pledging 
the first $50 million towards the project.29  Twenty-seven universities now meet 
the $100 million revenue mark from earnings derived from college athletic  
programs.30 
 
of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH L. REV. 71, 86 (2006) (arguing that the 
NCAA’s insistence on characterizing student-athletes as amateurs masks the reality that universities employ 
players); Justin C. Vine, Note: Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes Are Employees Of Their  
University, 12 CARDOZO PUB L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 235, 266 (2013) (“allowing their academics to play second 
fiddle”). 
24. See Kelly Charles Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a New Tradition, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 181, 214 (2017); see also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 249 (noting that the college sports 
industry generates more than $11 million in revenue annually). 
25. Glenn M. Wong et al., NCAA Division I Athletic Directors: An Analysis of the Responsibilities,  
Qualifications and Characteristics, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (2015). 
26. Brad Wolverton & Sandhya Kambhampati, Colleges Raised $1.2 Billion in Donations for Sports in 
2015, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Raised-12-Bil-
lion/235058. 
27. See College Athletics Revenues and Expenses – 2008, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/ncaa/revenue 
[http://www.kashefmajid.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/College-Athletics-Revenues-and-Expenses-
ESPN.pdf] (last visited May 9, 2019). 
28. See Cork Gaines, Clemson’s $55 Million Football Facility, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2019), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/photos-clemsons-football-facility-2017-10; see also Will Hobson,  
At Clemson, Football Success Brings Windfall That Most Schools Only Dream Of, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/at-clemson-football-success-brings-windfall-that-
most-schools-only-dream-of/2016/09/21/2bdb12fa-791c-11e6-bd86-
b7bbd53d2b5d_story.html?utm_term=.a4fde750167a (documenting that the success of the football program 
has “brought surging donations to the university”). 
29. Matt Galloway, KU Unveils $350 Million Campaign to Renovate Memorial Stadium, Other Facilities, 
TOPEKA CAP.-J., Sept. 22, 2017, http://www.cjonline.com/sports/hawkzone/2017-09-22/ku-unveils-350-mil-
lion-campaign-renovate-memorial-stadium-other. 
30. Cork Gaines, Texas Tops the List of 27 Schools That Make the Most Money in Sports, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/schools-most-revenue-college-sports-texas-longhorns-
2017-11. 
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While amateurism in college sports is both promulgated and enforced by 
the NCAA,31 public betting on college sports events has become a lucrative 
business off the court.  An estimated $10 billion was bet on the outcome of the 
2018 NCAA March Madness basketball tournament, of which only $300  
million was wagered legally.32  Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent  
decision in Murphy v. NCAA, only four states—Nevada, Delaware, Montana 
and Oregon—allowed legal sports betting.33  However, in 2018, the U.S.  
Supreme Court overturned the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA), now allowing states the opportunity to draft regulations for legalized 
sports betting, to include gambling on college athletic events.34  With the  
legalization of sports wagering now an available option for each state, estimates 
reveal that between $160 billion and $400 billion could be gambled on college 
sporting events annually moving forward.35 
Even the NCAA, a not-for-profit organization, is a highly profitable  
business venture that has grown exponentially since its inception.36  Its licensing 
affiliate, Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC), has paid more than $200 billion 
in royalties to its collegiate partners, which includes the NCAA.37  During its 
2017 fiscal year, the NCAA reported $1.1 billion in revenue.38  The majority of 
the organization’s revenue—which is mainly dispersed to its executives and 
member athletic programs—derives from television and marketing rights.39  In 
2018 alone, the organization earned $857 million from Turner Broadcasting for 
 
31. See NCAA, 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2, 2.9, at 3 (Aug. 1, 2018) (“The Principle of 
Amateurism”). 
32. Press Release, 97% of Expected $10 Billion Wagered on March Madness To Be Bet Illegally, AM. 
GAMING ASS’N (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.americangaming.org/new/97-of-expected-10-billion-wagered-
on-march-madness-to-be-bet-illegally/. 
33. See John Warren Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur Sports Gambling: Gambling Away 
Our Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221, 231-32 (2002) (noting that four states were exempted from the 
enactment of the Sports Protection Act in 1992, including Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana). 
34. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
35. Dennis Dodd, Legalized Betting Is Coming to College Football, and the SEC Is Bracing for Impact, 
CBS SPORTS (May 31, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/legalized-betting-is-coming-
to-college-football-and-the-sec-is-bracing-for-impact/. 
36. See Amber Jorgensen, Why Collegiate Athletes Could Have the NCAA, et al. Singing A Different 
Tune, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.  367, 371 (2015). 
37. See About IMG College Licensing, IMG C. LICENSING, http://www.imgcollegelicensing.com/About-
CLC.aspx (last visited May 9, 2019). 
38. Scooby Axson, NCAA: Organization Posts $1.1 Billion in Revenues, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 7, 
2018, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/03/07/ncaa-1-billion-revenue. 
39. See David A. Grenardo, The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions of a Former 
College Athlete Turned Law Professor, 95 OR. L. REV. 223, 224, 236 (2016); see also Darren Rovell, NCAA 
Tops $1 Billion in Revenue for First Time, ESPN (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/22678988/ncaa-tops-1-billion-revenue-first (noting that an audit of the NCAA’s 2017  
financial statements indicate that it dispersed $560.3 million to its 1,100 member institutions). 
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airing the March Madness tournament series.40  Such hefty numbers have 
prompted questions about the reasonableness of the NCAA’s continued status 
as a tax-exempt organization.41 
Another growing area of contention among scholars entails the increasingly 
lucrative coaching salaries now being paid by higher education institutions.42  
The NCAA does not regulate coaching salaries, allowing universities the  
freedom to pay their athletic coaching staff any salary agreed upon without a 
cap.43  Magnified coaching salaries in the collegiate environment serve as one 
of the top out-of-pocket costs for athletic departments.44  Although more than 
ten head college football coaches earn less than half a million dollars a year,45 
leading NCAA-member universities pay serious money for successful coaching 
staff.46  In all but a handful of states, college football and men’s basketball 
coaches are now the highest-paid public employees.47  Sample salaries at the top 
of the pay scale include Mike Krzyzewski, head men’s basketball coach at Duke 
University, who earns $8,982,325; Nick Saban, head football coach at the  
University of Alabama, who earns $8,307,000; John Calipari, men’s basketball 
coach at the University of Kentucky, who earns $7,450,000; and Dabo Swinney, 
 
40. Andrew McCulloch, Column: Don’t Miss the Ball, MANEATER (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.thema-
neater.com/stories/sports/dont-miss-ball.  See Aaron Mansfield, Here’s How Much Money Americans Will 
Bet on March Madness This Month, COMPLEX, Mar. 12, 2018, http://www.complex.com/sports/2018/03/how-
much-money-americans-will-bet-march-madness-month.   
41. See infra text accompanying notes 126-35. 
42. See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Enhancing “Education”: Rebalancing the Relationship Between  
Athletics and the University, 78 LA. L. REV. 197, 200 (2018) (noting the “wild increase” in coaching salaries 
at universities); Grenardo, supra note 39, at 227 (opining on the inequities of high coaching salaries versus 
the disallowance of the pay-for-play model in college sports); David A. Grenardo, The Duke Model: A  
Performance-Based Solution for Compensating College Athletes, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 157, 159-162 (2017) 
(discussing that while college coaches and athletic directors “flourish economically,” student-athletes are  
prohibited from earning income from their sport); M. Mark Heekin & Bruce W. Burton, Compensation For 
College Athletes: The Nondestructive Solution, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 364, 373-374 
(2015) (noting that universities are willing to increase coaching salaries to promote success in college  
athletics). 
43. Grenardo, supra note 39, at 227. 
44. Berry III, supra note 42 (providing that increasing coaching salaries and expanding athletic facilities 
serve as the two greatest costs to college athletic programs). 
45. United States Department of Labor, Coaches and Scouts, BUREAU L. STAT. (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/entertainment-and-sports/coaches-and-scouts.htm.  See Jonah Newman, Coaches, 
Not Presidents, Top Public-College Pay List, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 16, 2014), https://www.chroni-
cle.com/blogs/data/2014/05/16/coaches-not-presidents-top-public-college-pay-list/. 
46. See Jimmy Boyd, List of Top FBS Head Coach Salary for NCAA Football in 2018, BOYDSBETS, 
https://www.boydsbets.com/highest-paid-college-football-coaches/ (last visited May 9, 2019). 
47. Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest-Paid Employee A Coach? (Probably), 
DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013), https://deadspin.com/infographic-is-your-states-highest-paid-employee-a-co-
489635228. 
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head football coach at Clemson, who earns $6,205,000.48  In 2017, twenty  
college football coaches earned over $4 million in salaries, with at least  
seventy-five earning at least $1 million.49  Another fourteen college basketball 
coaches earn at least $3 million annually.50 
While college athletics have persistently been driven by unquenchable  
pressures to win, escalating coaching salaries have prompted questions about 
the prioritization of sports over academics in higher education.51  Increasing 
coaches’ earnings have also called into question the continued legitimacy of 
maintaining the aura of amateurism in college sports, particularly when unpaid 
student-athletes are the workhorses of successful athletic programs.52  The  
development of the so called “arms race” of rising coaching salaries also 
prompts issues of the commercialization of big time college athletics.53  Still, 
universities interpret higher coaching salaries as being an investment in  
successful athletic programs, resulting in positive effects on the overall quality 
of student enrollment, faculty, and alumni and booster donations.54  However, 
investing exuberant funds into athletic programs is resulting in competitive  
inequity, allowing financially dominant NCAA Division I teams to continue 
building and strengthening as compared to less economically prosperous  
programs.55 
Academic scholars, in conjunction with the American legal system, have 
expressed opinions on the growing controversy surrounding the  
 
48. David A. Tomar, The 25 Highest-Paid College Coaches of 2019, QUAD, https://thebest-
schools.org/magazine/highest-paid-college-coaches/ (last visited May 9, 2019). 
49. Richard Johnson, College Football Coach Salaries: A Skyrocketing History, 1869-2018, SB NATION 
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/6/4/17390394/college-football-coach-sal-
ary-history-highest. 
50. College Basketball Coaches Who Make More Than $3 Million, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2018, 
https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/sports/ncaab/2018/02/26/college-basketball-coaches-who-make-
more-than-3-million/110866872/. 
51. See Berry III, supra note 42, at 204. 
52. See Christopher Sweeney, Judges Are Not ‘Super-Referees’: Why a Qualified Statutory Exemption to 
the Sherman Act is Needed to Reform the NCAA and its Exploitive Amateur Model, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
125, 137-138 (2015) (noting that high coaching and administration salaries are made possible because the 
workforce (aka student-athletes) are not paid). 
53. See Heekin & Burton, supra note 42, at 372-74 (discussing the arms race of college coaching  
salaries). 
54. Id. at 373 (noting the positive effects of higher coaching salaries); see also Lora Weurdeman,  
Sidelining Big Business in Intercollegiate Athletics: How the NCAA Can De-Escalate the Arms Race by  
Implementing a Budgetary Allocation for Athletic Departments, 39 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 85, 89 (2017)  
(discussing that increases in expenditures of coaching salaries and sports facilities has led to an arms race in 
intercollegiate sports in order to gain top recruits, coaches, and a “competitive advantage.”). 
55. Grenardo, supra note 39, at 262 (documenting that the arms race has “likely negated” the NCAA’s 
equalizing restraints on the pay-for-play model). 
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professionalization of college sports.56  Amateurism, however, continues to be 
the mainstay amidst the profit-maximizing world that college athletics has 
evolved into.  The “tradition” of non-professionalism on the collegiate playing 
field has provided shelter to scholarship-recipient student-athletes from being 
taxed on their grants-in-aid.57  In addition, the IRS has also only rarely attempted 
to impose taxes on the college sports industry.58 As the historically  
tax-favorable status of college sports has now been challenged following the 
signing of the TCJA, it is important to understand early efforts to tax  
intercollegiate athletics. 
B. Taxing College Sports – A Historical View 
Until the TCJA was signed into law, college sports appreciated relatively 
amicable federal tax treatment.  While critics have called into question the  
tax-exempt status of the NCAA, its member institutions,59 and the employment 
 
56. See, e.g., Joseph Davison, Throwing the Flag on Pay-For-Play: The O’Bannon Ruling and the Future 
of Paid Student-Athletes, 11 WASH. J.L., TECH. & ARTS 155 (2015) (analyzing the impact of litigation on 
amateurism in college sports); Christian Dennie, He Shoots, He Scores: An Analysis of O’Bannon v. NCAA 
on Appeal and the Future of Intercollegiate Sports, 93 N.C.L. REV. 90 (2015) (offering arguments about the 
future of college athletics after the O’Bannon case); Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, Northwestern, 
O’Bannon, and The Future: Cultivating a New Era for Taxing Qualified Scholarships, 49 AKRON L. REV. 
771 (2016) (analyzing whether student-athletes’ qualified scholarships should be taxed); César F. Rosado 
Marzán & Alex Tillett-Saks, Work, Study, and Organize!: Why the Northwestern University Football Players 
are Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301, 303-304  
(discussing the commercialization and professionalization of college sports); Josephine R. Potuto et al., 
What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 
OR. L. REV. 879 (2014) (analyzing the shift from amateurism to professionalism in college sports); see also 
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015); Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate  
Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992) (addressing that permitting professional athletes and 
agents into NCAA sports would destroy amateurism in college sports); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 
No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), rev’d Nw. Univ. & College Athletes 
Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167, 2-3, (2015) (No. 13-RC-121359). 
57. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 269; see also Letter from John A. Koskinen, IRS 
Commissioner, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, to Richard Burr (R-N.C.), Senator, U.S. Senate (Apr. 9, 2014)  
(available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0016.pdf [https://perma.cc/35YH-CYSH]).  Letter from John 
A. Koskinen to Senator Richard Burr (R-N.C.) in response to Burr’s March 28, 2014, letter to Koskinen, 
Commissioner of the IRS until November 12, 2017, in which Burr requested confirmation of the federal tax 
treatment of college athletic scholarships.  Id.  Koskinen responded that “[i]t has long been the position of the 
Internal Revenue Service that athletic scholarships can qualify for exclusion from income under section 117.”  
Id.  The letter further states with regard to the 1977 Revenue Ruling 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47, that “the athletic 
scholarship awarded by the university is primarily to aid the recipients in pursuing their studies and, therefore, 
is excludable under section 117.”  Id. 
58. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 250. 
59. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
109, 110 (2010) (noting dissenters of the tax-exempt status of the NCAA, including political representative 
Bill Thomas (R-CA22) and George Will, Op-Ed Columnist for The Washington Post). 
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status of student-athletes,60 the federal government has generally provided 
agreeable tax treatment across the entirety of college sports.61  However, such 
favorable treatment has periodically been weighed and measured by the  
American legal system, academic scholars, the IRS, and Congress. 
1. Student-Athletes’ Qualified Scholarships 
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section 61 establishes the edict for taxing 
gross income, allowing an exclusion under Section 117 for money received in 
the form of qualified scholarships.62  Such exclusion is limited to scholarship 
funds that are not attached to a condition for receipt.63  The IRS has held the 
position that there is currently no evidence of quid pro quo in college sports, 
which would require that student-athletes’ scholarship funds be taxed.64  This 
stance is distinguishable from various findings by both the U.S. Supreme Court 
and Tax Court that select fellowship and scholarship recipients are in a quid pro 
quo relationship, thus delineating the available exclusion under the Code.65   
In Bingler v. Johnson, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Ph.D. 
students’ work-in-exchange-for-study stipends were taxable.66  In both Bonn v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Proskey v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, the U.S. Tax Court held that funds received by research physicians in 
exchange for hospital services were quid pro quo taxable.67  The Tax Court also 
identified a quid pro quo relationship in Zolnay v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue where a research assistant received fellowship funds conducive to a 
supervisory work position.68  In circumstances where no quid pro quo  
relationship was found to exist, the Tax Court has held that fellowship funds 
were excludable from gross income.69 
 
60. See Valrie Chambers & Michael E. Bitter, Potential Tax Implications of NCAA Family Travel  
Allowances, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 187, 190 (2017) (documenting that student-athletes’ amateur status, 
as well as the tax-exempt organizations they are affiliated with, are being vigorously tested). 
61. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 254. 
62. 26 U.S.C. §§ 61, 117 (2019).  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 56, at 774; see also 26 U.S.C. 
§ 117(b)(2)(A), (B) (2019).   
63. 26 U.S.C. § 117(c).  See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969). 
64. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 56, at 774 (citing to Potuto et al., supra note 56, at 890 n.40). 
65. See, e.g., Bingler, 394 U.S. at 758; Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 
1983); Bonn v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 64 (1960); Proskey v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 918 (1969); Zolnay v. Comm’r, 49 
T.C. 389 (1968). 
66. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 758. 
67. See Bonn, 34 T.C. 64; see also Proskey, 51 T.C. 918. 
68. See Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389. 
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1348 (1986) (the Court found that the petitioner’s 
receipt of funds as a graduate assistant required no condition(s) as part of the agreement with the university); 
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While determining the existence of a quid pro quo relationship is standard 
operating procedure by courts when evaluating the taxability of qualified  
scholarships under I.R.C. Section 117(c), student-athlete scholarship recipients 
have enjoyed a rather courteous exemption by the IRS from such standard.70  
Revenue Ruling 77-263, drafted in 1977 in response to a request for guidance 
on whether student-athletes’ scholarship awards are taxable, excludes athletic 
scholarships from the quid pro quo standard.71  In providing this guidance, the 
ruling specifies that “athletic scholarships are awarded by the university  
primarily to aid the recipients in pursuing their studies, and therefore, the value 
of the scholarships is excludable from the recipients’ gross income . . . .”72   
The quid pro quo standard was mirrored in the 1983 case Rensing v. Indiana 
State University Board of Trustees.73  In that case, the Indiana Supreme Court 
found that Rensing, a football player at Indiana State University, was not found 
to be “in the service of” the institution for purposes of workers’ compensation 
eligibility.74  The Court cited to Revenue Ruling 77-263, documenting that 
“[t]he Internal Revenue Service has ruled that scholarship recipients are not 
taxed on their scholarship proceeds.”75  In overturning the lower court’s  
decision, the majority agreed with and quoted Judge Young’s dissent76 in the 
Fourth District Court of Appeals decision: 
Rensing’s participation in football may well have benefited the 
university in a very general way.  That does not mean that  
Rensing was in the service of the Trustees.  If a student wins a 
Rhodes scholarship or if the debate team wins a national award 
that undoubtedly benefits the school, but does not mean that the 
student and the team are in the service of the school.  Rensing 
 
Spiegelman v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 394 (1994) (the Court held that fellowship grant funds awarded to the  
taxpayer during his doctoral studies were not provided as compensation for services rendered, and thus not 
subject to self-employment income tax). 
70. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 56, at 782; see also Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47.  
71. See Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47. 
72. Id. 
73. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (this case was issued based 
on a question of whether a scholarship-recipient football player was eligible to receive workers’ compensation 
benefits.  Although Rensing would not necessarily be relied on in determining whether a student-athletes’ 
scholarship funds are taxable, the case evidences the American legal system’s perception of amateurism in 
college sports); see also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 56, at 801. 
74. Rensing, 444 N.E. 2d at 1174. 
75. Id. at 1173. 
76. Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 437 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (Young, J., dissenting). 
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performed no duties that would place him in the service of the 
university.77 
The Rensing decision has been used as precedent in later cases involving 
student-athletes.  In the Supreme Court of Massachusetts case Kavanagh v. 
Trustees of Boston University, a college basketball player sought vicarious  
liability from Boston University (BU) after a BU scholarship athlete punched 
the plaintiff during a game.78  In its opinion, the majority cited to Rensing,  
noting, “proceeds of athletic scholarships are not taxable as income.”79  In the 
Texas Court of Appeals case Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass’n, a 
college football player sought workers’ compensation benefits following an  
injury during play for Texas Christian University (TCU).80  The majority  
decision, documenting that no income taxes had been withheld from Waldrep’s 
grant-in-aid, cited to Rensing in making its determination that “Waldrep was not 
in the service of TCU.”81 
Outside of these cases and Revenue Ruling 77-263, the only outlying  
precedent to come forward concerning the federal tax treatment of  
student-athletes’ scholarship funds is a letter from IRS Commissioner John A. 
Koskinen to Senator Richard Burr (R-NC) written in 2014.82  Commissioner 
Koskinen’s letter, drafted in response to Senator Burr’s request for confirmation 
of the federal tax treatment of student-athletes’ athletic scholarship funds  
following the Chicago district (Region 13) of the National Labor Relations 
Board’s (NLRB) decision to allow Northwestern University football players to 
unionize and bargain collectively,83 confirmed the IRS’s 1977 position,  
documenting, “[i]t has long been the position of the Internal Revenue Service 
that athletic scholarships can qualify for exclusion from income under Section 
117.”84   
Although literary scholars have argued that a quid pro quo relationship does 
in fact exist between scholarship-recipient student-athletes and the universities 
 
77. Id. at 90 (emphasis added); see also Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174 (emphasis added). 
78. Kavanagh v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 440 Mass. 195 (Mass. 2003). 
79. Id. at 199 (citing Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173). 
80. Waldrep v. Texas Emp’rs. Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000).   
81. Id. at 701; see also Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Wolford, 526 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex. 1975) (documenting that 
withholding of taxes is indicia of employee status). 
82. See Letter from John A. Koskinen, supra note 57.  
83. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).  Note, the region 13 decision was later overturned in Nw. Univ. & College Athletes 
Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167, 2-3, (2015) (No. 13-RC-121359). 
84. See Letter from John A. Koskinen, supra note 57.  
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they play for, the IRS has never changed its stance.85  Thus, student-athletes 
currently remain free from the long arm of federal taxation on funds received 
from athletic scholarships.  However, it is important to consider that while the 
TCJA does not directly target student-athletes’ grants-in-aid as being taxable, 
the new tax law could have an impact on athletic departments’ abilities to  
fundraise enough contributions to substantiate the current levels of athletic 
scholarships moving forward.86 
2. Taxing the Greater College Sports Arena 
Similar to student-athletes’ grants-in-aid, the IRS has historically granted 
favorable tax treatment to the greater college sports industry.87  I.R.C. Section 
501(c)(3) provides a tax exemption for charitable organizations, including  
corporations organized for educational purposes.88  Private universities meeting 
the educational requirements of Section 501(c)(3) qualify for federal  
tax-exemption, with minor exception.89  In addition, public universities also 
qualify for charitable exemption, with many eligible for tax exemption due to 
their being considered an arm of the state in providing essential governmental 
functions as codified in I.R.C. Section 115.90   
 
85. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23, at 316 (documenting that “a quid pro quo is the essence of the  
relationship between the athlete and his university”); Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 56, at 789 (noting 
the Bingler application has not been applied to student-athletes); McCormick & McCormick, supra note 23, 
at 115 (stating “[t]he fact that a university can terminate financial aid to a player immediately upon the  
athlete’s refusal to play demonstrates that such aid is compensation and a quid pro quo for athletic services 
rendered”); Sean Alan Roberts, Comment, College Athletes, Universities, and Workers’ Compensation:  
Placing the Relationship in the Proper Context by Recognizing Scholarship Athletes as Employees, 37 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 1315, 1317-1318 (1996) (stating that “[a] contractual relationship and a ‘pay-for-play’ arrangement 
unarguably exists” between student-athletes and their universities). 
86. See Kyle Rowland, College Athletic Departments Wrestle With Impact of Tax Bill, BLADE (Feb. 3, 
2018), http://www.toledoblade.com/College/2018/02/02/College-athletic-departments-wrestle-with-impact-
of-tax-bill.html (noting the impact of fundraising on college athletic scholarships); Dirk P. Katstra, New Tax 
Legislation, VA ATHLETICS FOUND., http://virginiaathleticsfoundation.com/new-tax-legislation/ (last visited 
May 9, 2019) (documenting the importance of contributions being made to the Virginia Athletics Foundation 
for purposes of maintaining college athletics scholarships). 
87. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 254. 
88. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2019). 
89. See Tax Exemption for Universities and Colleges, ASS’N AM. U. (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU%20Files/Key%20Issues/Taxation%20%26%20Finance/Tax-
Exempt-Status-of-Universities-FINAL.pdf (last visited May 9, 2019); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an IRS policy denying tax-exempt status to 
private universities adhering to racially discriminatory admissions procedures). 
90. See 26 U.S.C. § 115 (2019); see also Tax Exemption for Universities and Colleges, supra note 89. 
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i. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and College Athletic Programs 
Section 501(c)(3) extends a tax exemption to amateur sports organizations 
fostering “national or international amateur sports competition.”91  Athletic  
programs can qualify for tax-exempt status if they are affiliated with a  
tax-exempt educational organization, such as a college or university.  In 1967, 
the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 67-291, providing that university athletic  
programs are “an integral part” of the educational process and help further “the 
educational program of the university,” thus qualifying for federal tax  
exemption.92  In 1980, the agency issued Revenue Rule 80-296, rearticulating 
that college and university athletic departments are generally considered  
educational in nature.93  Case law has subsequently supported this stance. 
In Kondos v. West Virginia Board of Regents, for example, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia stated, “the carrying on of an 
athletic program is an important and necessary element in the educational  
process, especially at institutions of higher learning.”94  The Tenth Circuit later 
upheld a U.S. Tax Court decision in Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, finding that “the furtherance of recreational 
and amateur sports” continues to be a charitable activity.95  Soon after, in  
Greenhill v. Carpenter, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted: 
For well over one hundred years athletic programs have been 
an integral part of the educational process in colleges and  
universities throughout this country . . . .  The development of 
a student’s physical body, team work, and sportsmanship have 
all been part of the college and university educational process, 
notwithstanding the fact that in recent years big-time college 
athletics have at times taken on a tinge of commercialism.96 
In the 1993 case Cohen v. Brown University, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit opined: 
For college students, athletics offers an opportunity to exacuate 
[sic] leadership skills, learn teamwork, build self-confidence, 
 
91. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).  Note, however, that this exemption does not apply to amateur sports  
competition activities that “involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment.”  Id. 
92. Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184.  
93. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195. 
94. Kondos v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 318 F. Supp. 394, 396 (S.D.W. Va. 1970), aff’d, 441 F.2d 1172 
(4th Cir. 1971). 
95. Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises, Inc. v. Comm’r, 696 F.2d 757, 762 (10th Cir. 1982). 
96. Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (affirming the lower court’s  
dismissal of the claim brought by the mother of a student-athlete killed in plane crash; finding sovereign 
immunity entitlement to the defendants). 
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and perfect self-discipline. In addition, for many  
student-athletes, physical skills are a passport to college  
admissions and scholarships, allowing them to attend otherwise 
inaccessible schools. These opportunities, and the lessons 
learned on the playing fields, are invaluable in attaining career 
and life successes in and out of professional sports.97 
Three years later, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Harris v. University of 
Michigan Board of Regents echoed the IRS’s stance on college athletics, stating, 
“Congress apparently considers collegiate athletics sufficiently related to higher 
education to embrace such activities within the exemption from federal income 
tax accorded to educational institutions under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal  
Revenue Code . . . .”98  Thus, like the universities they are affiliated with, college 
athletic departments have generally enjoyed tax-favorable status under the  
umbrella of I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3).99 
ii. Taxing Unrelated Business Income 
While colleges and universities enjoy tax exemption from revenues derived 
from their charitable purposes, any activities they partake in which results in 
unrelated business income (UBI) is taxable.100  UBI is income earned from  
activities regularly carried on by an organization, but not substantially related 
to its tax-exempt purpose.101  The premise behind the UBI rules, codified in 
I.R.C. Section 512, is to regulate tax-exempt organizations conducting  
commercial business activities not within the purview of their stated charitable 
purposes, thus putting non-profit organizations on equal footing with for-profit 
entities participating in the same type of activity.102  Examples of collegiate  
activities that may be subject to UBI tax include: gift and bookstore sales;  
mailing list rentals or sales; analytical laboratory facility rentals; advertising; 
 
97. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming the lower court’s decision to 
extend a preliminary injunction reinstating select women’s athletic programs to varsity status). 
98. Harris v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 558 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (the court 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment by the lower court to the board of regents, university president, and 
athletics director following an injured student-athlete’s complaint that athletic department activities were  
conducted primarily for profit, and thus not sheltered by government immunity). 
99. See Darren A. Heitner, Money and Sports: Economic Realities of Being an Athlete, 8 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 168 (2012). 
100. 26 U.S.C. § 512 (2019).   
101. Id. § 512(a)(1); see also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 254. 
102. See 26 U.S.C. § 512; see also William A. Bailey, The Taxman on Campus: How Aggressive IRS 
Initiatives are Increasing Audit and Compliance Risk for Colleges and Universities, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
215, 226 (2012). 
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restaurant and catering income; parking lot services; franchise agreements; and 
concession stand income.103 
The IRS’s historical emphasis on college athletics being integral to  
universities’ educational (and thus charitable) functions has resulted in a rather 
unrestrictive application of the UBI rules to the college sports industry.104   
Almost all revenue generated by college athletics, including ticket sales,  
broadcasting rights, and corporate sponsorships have been found to facilitate the 
greater educational role of their tax-exempt universities.105  In Revenue Ruling 
80-295, the IRS dictated that the sale of television (TV) and broadcasting rights 
to an independent producer by a tax-exempt organization serving as a national 
governing body for amateur athletics is not UBI.106  Immediately after, the IRS 
issued Revenue Ruling 80-296 which publicized that income derived from the 
sale of broadcasting rights to national radio and TV networks by regional  
college athletic conference organizations is also not considered UBI.107   
These two rulings arose after the IRS’s 1977 highly-debated attempt to  
impose a UBI tax on radio and broadcasting revenue stemming from college 
bowl games.108  The agency changed its unfavorable position just one year later, 
issuing a Technical Memorandum in 1978 to the Cotton Bowl Athletic  
Association (CBAA) stating that it would not impose a tax on the income from 
the sale of broadcast rights during football games, while also highlighting the 
impact of college sports on education.109  Over a decade later, in 1991, the IRS 
again initiated an attempt to impose a UBI tax on a sponsorship payment made 
by Mobile Oil Corporation (Mobil) to the CBAA in return for naming rights to 
the bowl game.110  Immense objections ensued, prompting Congress to step in 
 
103. Bailey, supra note 102, at 227.  See Examples of Possible Unrelated Business Activities, TEX. A&M 
U. SYS., https://www.tamus.edu/business/budgets-and-accounting/tax-services/tax-manual/appendix-b/ex-
amples-of-possible-unrelated-business-activities/ (last visited May 9, 2019) (listing a volume of potential  
examples of UBI at the university level). 
104. See Erin Guruli, Commerciality of College Sports: Should the IRS Intercept?, 12 SPORTS L.J. 43, 44 
(2005). 
105. Alfred Dennis Mathewson, By Education or Commerce: The Legal Basis for the Federal Regulation 
of the Economic Structure of Intercollegiate Athletics, 76 UMKC L. REV. 597, 613 n.114 (2008) (citing to 
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37618 (July 28, 1978) (documenting that broadcast rights are substantially related 
to education)). 
106. Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194. 
107. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195.   
108. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 255; see also Wirtschafter, supra note 12, at  
1472-73. 
109. Wirtschafter, supra note 12, at 1473 n.74 (citing to I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 
1978)); see also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 255. 
110. James L. Musselman, Recent Federal Income Tax Issues Regarding Professional and Amateur 
Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 208 (2003). 
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and issue proposed regulations to overturn the IRS’s position on the matter.111  
As recently as 1996, the Michigan Court of Appeals articulated the tax  
protections afforded to college athletics, noting “income generated by . . .  
college sports teams from admission tickets and broadcasting revenue is not 
considered ‘unrelated business income’ subject to tax.”112 
iii. Taxing Charitable Donors 
In addition to the historically favorable tax treatment bestowed on  
universities and their affiliated athletic programs, I.R.C. Section 170 grants  
individual taxpayers a deduction for contributions made to charitable  
organizations, including institutes of higher education.113  In Revenue Ruling 
67-246, the IRS articulated that charitable contributions are deductible for  
Section 170 purposes so long as they are considered a gift.114  This ruling further 
expands that gifts constitute a monetary payment or property transfer without 
unconditional restrictions attached.115  In the case where a charitable  
contribution is made in exchange for the purchase of an item, a taxpayer must 
establish that any contribution exceeding the value of such item is considered a 
gift in order to benefit from Section 170.116  Generally, charitable contribution 
deductions are capped at 50% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI).117 
Through the end of calendar year 2017, Section 170 also provided donors 
an 80% charitable deduction for contributions made to educational institutions, 
which included (as a condition of the donation) a right to purchase preferential 
seating at university athletic events.118  This benefit was not birthed without 
 
111. Id.; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(f) (Ex. 4) (1983); 58 Fed. Reg. 5687 (Jan. 22, 1993). 
112. Harris v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 558 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).  
113. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2019). 
114. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. 
115. Id. 
116. Id.; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 110217-99 (Mar. 24, 2000). 
117. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b). 
118. Id. § 170(l).  Prior to January 1, 2018, I.R.C. Section 170(l) read:  
(1) For purposes of this section, 80 percent of any amount described in paragraph (2) shall 
be treated as a charitable contribution.   
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), an amount is described in this paragraph if—  
(A) the amount is paid by the taxpayer to or for the benefit of an educational  
organization—  
(i) which is described in subsection (b)(1)(A)(ii), and  
(ii) which is an institution of higher education (as defined in section 3304(f)), and  
(B) such amount would be allowable as a deduction under this section but for the fact 
that the taxpayer receives (directly or indirectly) as a result of paying such amount the 
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initial scrutiny.  In 1984 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 84-132, pronouncing 
that preferred seating at university sporting events had significant value, thus 
denying taxpayers the ability to deduct any part of their donation to a university 
athletic program that accompanied such right unless it was established that part 
of the contribution exceeded the value of the right to buy tickets.119  Following 
immediate backlash, the IRS suspended the Ruling, issuing an Announcement 
that the agency would hold a public session to discuss the issue.120  Two years 
later, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 86-63, officially superseding Revenue 
Ruling 84-132, allowing for a deduction equal to the difference between the 
contribution and the value of the preferred seating.121  Once again, this ruling 
was met with criticism.122  Two years later, Congress enacted the Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 which stipulated that 80% of amounts  
contributed to institutions of higher education that included a “right to purchase 
tickets for seating at an athletic event in an athletic stadium of such institution,” 
would be allowed as a deduction.123 
Acknowledgement of this new benefit was later prescribed in a 1999 IRS 
Technical Advice Memorandum following a taxpayer’s request for guidance on 
whether a portion of their payment made to a state university’s foundation, 
which included the right to buy seating in the skybox located in the university 
athletic stadium, was deductible.124  The IRS concluded that the portion of  
payment that included the taxpayer’s right to purchase preferred seating  
constituted a “benefit of the University,” thus allowing an 80% deduction of the 
payment under Section 170.125 
iv. Tax-Exemption and the NCAA 
While the above analysis highlights the historical federal tax benefits  
afforded to institutions of higher education, their affiliate athletic programs, and 
 
right to purchase tickets for seating at athletic event in an athletic stadium of such  
institution.   
If any portion of a payment is for the purchase of such tickets, such portion and the  
remaining portion (if any) of such payment shall be treated as separate amounts for  
purposes of this subsection. 
26 U.S.C. § 170(l) (2017).  
119. Rev. Rul. 84-132, 1984-2 C.B. 55. 
120. See Kristin Balding Gutting, Relighting the Charitable Deduction: A Proposed Public Benefit  
Exception, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 453, 485 (2012); see also Announcement 84-101, 1984-45 I.R.B. 21. 
121. Gutting, supra note 120; see also Rev. Rul. 86-63, 1986-1 C.B. 88. 
122. Gutting, supra note 120, at 485. 
123. H.R. 4333, 100th Cong. § 6001(a) (1988). 
124. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 122293-98 (July 7, 1999). 
125. Id. 
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their generous charitable donors, an examination of amateur athletics would not 
be complete without a brief discussion of the tax treatment of the NCAA.  Like 
most colleges and universities, the NCAA has benefited from significant federal 
tax protection.126  As stated earlier, I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3) provides a tax  
exemption to organizations fostering “national or international amateur sports 
competition.”127  Since its inception, the NCAA has successfully maintained its 
tax-exempt status under the parameters of this Code section.128   
The organization’s stated core purpose is to “govern competition in a fair, 
safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner, and to integrate intercollegiate  
athletics into higher education so that the educational experience of the  
student-athlete is paramount.”129  So long as the NCAA continues its promotion 
to operate exclusively for educational purposes, it should continue its tax  
favorable status; however, that status could be revoked if any of its earnings 
“inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”130  Some have 
questioned whether this is already occurring.   
It has been argued that the NCAA and its member institutions engage in 
activities not generally affiliated with non-profit organizations, including the 
imposition of politically correct standards of tolerance on member organizations 
and entering into billion dollar contract agreements.131  Academic scholars and 
the American legal system have probed whether the NCAA should instead be 
recognized as a for-profit business.132  The U.S. Supreme Court, in NCAA v. 
 
126. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 256; see also Colombo, supra note 59, at 133  
(noting that the NCAA benefits from tax-exemption).  
127. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).  Note, however, that this exemption does not apply to amateur sports  
competition activities that “involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment.”  Id. 
128. See id. (noting that the NCAA is a Section 501(c)(3) organization).   
129. NCAA Strategic Plan, NCAA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Apr. 2004), http://www.ncaapublica-
tions.com/productdownloads/SP04.pdf. 
130. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). 
131. See ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 42-42 (2013) (noting the NCAA’s tax-exempt status receives  
intense public scrutiny over whether its primary purpose is educational when its actions are clearly motivated 
by raising revenue, and providing that it is treated no differently than Salvation Army, Goodwill, United Way, 
Red Cross, or the Ronald McDonald House, none of which have billion dollar television contracts).   
132. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 59 (analyzing the NCAA as a tax-exempt organization following the 
2006 inquiry by the U.S. Congress asking the organization to justify its exemption); Michael A. Corgan, 
Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption 
of College Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 387-88 (2012) (addressing the tax-exempt status of the NCAA); Richard G. 
Johnson, Submarining Due Process: How the NCAA Uses its Restitution Rule to Deprive College Athletes of 
Their Right of Access to the Courts . . . Until Oliver v. NCAA, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 459, 536 (2010) 
(questioning the reasonableness  of the NCAA’s tax-exempt status when it spends millions of dollars annually 
on legal fees in order to fight college athletes); Amy C. McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s 
New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 504 (2008) (stating that 
the NCAA’s status as a tax-exempt organization should be re-examined); Kadence A. Otto & Kristal S.  
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Board of Regents, acknowledged that the NCAA is organized as a non-profit 
organization, but added footnote commentary suggesting, “the economic  
significance of the NCAA’s nonprofit character is questionable at best . . . the 
NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize revenue  
. . . .”133  Even Congress has required that the NCAA indorse its position as a 
nonprofit organization.134  Still, through this varied scrutiny, the NCAA has thus 
far maintained its tax-exempt status.135 
The above analyses illustrate a history of the generally amicable federal tax 
treatment blanketing college athletics.  Beginning January 1, 2018, however, 
certain new federal tax rules prescribed in the TCJA will have a direct or indirect 
impact on the college sports arena.  Section III identifies and addresses the  
specific TCJA provisions that could influence U.S. college sports in the future. 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT ON COLLEGE SPORTS 
During his presidential campaign, one of Donald Trump’s promises  
included his interest in making “big league” changes to the nation’s federal tax 
laws.136  As “big-league” Division I college sports have steadily transformed 
amateur athletics into a lucrative commercial industry,137 President Trump’s 
verbiage may have foreshadowed imminent tax changes coming to the college 
sports industry.  Although the proposed November 2017 Republican-sponsored 
 
Stippich, Revisiting Tarkanian: The Entwinement and Interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities 
and Colleges 20 Years Later, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 243, 275-79 (2008) (discussing the complexities 
surrounding the NCAA’s tax-exempt status and noting that not only is the NCAA exempt from federal income 
taxes, but has been exempt from state taxes as well); Amanda Pintaro, Is the NCAA Fulfilling its Tax-Exempt 
Status?, ILL. BUS. L.J. (2010) (analyzing the tax-exempt status of the NCAA); see also Nat’l Collegiate Realty 
Corp. v. Bd. of Cty. Commr’s, 690 P.2d 1366 (Kan. 1984) (reasoning that property used by NCAA for its 
national headquarters was used exclusively for educational purposes within the meaning of state statute  
granting an exemption); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, 781 P.2d 726 (Kan. 
1989) (reasoning that the NCAA was an educational institution within the purview of applicable Kansas  
statute and therefore exempt from sales taxes in Kansas). 
133. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984). 
134. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 356; see also Colombo, supra note 59, at 149 (2010). 
135. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 356.  See Elia Powers, The NCAA Responds, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Nov. 16, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/16/ncaa-responds (referencing 
the twenty-five-page response drafted by Myles Brand—then President of the NCAA—to Capitol Hill  
defending the NCAA’s status as a tax-exempt organization). 
136. Ryan J. Clements, Trump’s “Big-League” Tax Reform: Assessing the Impact of Corporate Tax 
Changes, 7 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 2 (2017).   
137. See Howard LaFranchi, University Heads Cite Hard Lessons in Handling Sports Scandals.  
Maryland and Tulane Chiefs Urge Hands-On Leadership and Reforms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 25, 
1987), https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0325/acoll.html (referencing a change in “big-league college 
sports”); see also Elisabet Van Nostrand, Stony Brook Aims for Division I; Seeking ‘Big-League’ Sports  
Status, NEWSDAY (Dec. 5, 1991) (discussing the State University of New York at Stony Brook’s efforts to 
enter the “big-league” of college sports by pushing to enter the NCAA D-1 level). 
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bill included several sections that could have affected both professional and  
amateur athletics, only certain of these proposals were embedded in the final 
legislation.138  The chart depicted in Subsection (A) identifies pertinent sections 
of the TCJA and I.R.C. that could have a direct or indirect impact on the U.S. 
college sports industry moving forward.139  Subsection (B) provides more  
detailed consideration of the application of these rules to the overall college 
sports arena. 
A. The Effect of the TCJA on the U.S. College Sports Industry 
 
Applicable TCJA and I.R.C.  
Sections 
Brief Description 
Increase in Standard Deduction 
 
TCJA Section 11021 
Rev. Proc. 2018-18 amends I.R.C. 
Section 63(c)(2) 
The TCJA significantly increased the 
standard deduction amounts  
available under I.R.C. Section 63.  
Section 11021 of TCJA provides the  
following standard deductions  
beginning tax year 2018: $12,000 for 
individuals; $18,000 for heads of 
households; and $24,000 for married 
couples filing jointly. 
Limitation on Deduction by  
Employers of Expenses for Fringe  
Benefits  
 
TCJA Section 13304 
IRC Section 274 
Treas. Reg. Section 1.274-2 
The TCJA amends I.R.C. Section 
274 by removing employers’ ability 
to deduct the cost of tickets to  
sporting events purchased for the 
purpose of entertaining business  
clients and prospects.  Prior to this 
law taking effect, employers could 
deduct 50% of various business  
entertainment expenses, including 
the price of event tickets. 
Excise Tax on Excess Tax-Exempt 
Organization Executive  
Compensation 
 
The TCJA requires that applicable 
tax-exempt organizations pay a 21% 
excise tax on executive  
compensation deemed excessive.   
 
138. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017-2018) (introduced Nov. 2, 2017, enacted Dec. 22, 2017).  
139. Although outside the scope of this article to analyze the impact of the TCJA on professional sports, 
it should be noted that several sections of the final legislation embedded in the TCJA could have direct and/or 
indirect impacts on professional athletes and the industry in general. 
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TCJA Section 13602 
I.R.C. Section 4960 
 
Organizations subject to this  
provision include I.R.C. Section 
501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations.  
The tax applies to the top five highest 
paid employees whose annual  
compensation exceeds $1 million.   
Excise Tax Based on Investment  
Income of Private Colleges and  
Universities 
 
TCJA Section 13701 
I.R.C. Section 4968 
The TCJA amends Chapter 42 of the 
I.R.C. by adding a new provision, 
I.R.C. Section 4968, which imposes a 
1.4% excise tax on the investment  
income of qualifying private colleges 
and universities.  This provision  
applies to eligible private educational 
institutions that have: (1) at least 500 
students during the previous tax year; 
(2) more than 50% of whom were in 
the United States; and (3) at least 
$500,000 in aggregate fair market 
value of assets per student. 
Repeal of Deduction for Amounts 
Paid in Exchange for College  
Athletic Event Seating Rights 
 
TCJA Section 13704 
I.R.C. Section 170(l) 
The TCJA amends I.R.C. Section 
170(l) by repealing the 80/20  
deduction previously allowed for 
amounts paid in exchange for priority 
seating rights to college athletic 
events.   
B. Losing Tax Amicability – The TCJA Hits the College Sports Industry 
Following the $1.5 trillion dollar reconstruction of the U.S. Tax Code, the 
final provisions rooted in the TCJA could prove costly for college athletics  
programs across the nation.140  Although historically provided amicable tax 
treatment as discussed above, the college sports industry now faces significant 
financial implications.141  Particularly, the final legislation closed several  
loopholes that will require college athletic departments to mollify financial  
 
140. See Chris Smith, New Tax Law Could Cost Top College Athletic Departments Millions, FORBES, 
Dec. 22, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2017/12/22/gop-tax-law-could-cost-top-college-ath-
letic-departments-millions/#4bcb0740abea; see also Rowland, supra note 86 (noting the $1.5 trillion dollar 
cost to overhaul the U.S. tax code). 
141. See Matt Murschel, New Tax Law Could Prove Costly for College Athletics, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Feb. 17, 2018, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/college/college-gridiron-365/os-sp-college-athletics-
tax-law-changes-0219-story.html. 
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consequences associated with booster and alumni donations.142  One early  
estimate anticipates that the financial impact to the amateur sports industry—
due to the signing of the TCJA—could be in the millions of dollars.143   
A recent study conducted by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) found 
that the TCJA will reduce charitable giving in 2018 by 4%, equating to a  
reduction in overall donations of $16.3 to $17.2 billion dollars.144  As U.S.  
colleges raised $1.2 billion in sports donations in 2015 alone, the legislative 
branch’s decision to target college athletics prompted one commentator to  
publicly inquire, “[W]hether Congress just doesn’t like college sports.”145 
The two major components of the TCJA that will impact major college  
athletic programs across the country moving forward are the excise tax on  
executive compensation salaries and the loss of charitable deductions available 
to athletic ticket purchasers.  However, there are a number of provisions  
embedded in the final legislation that could also have an indirect impact on the 
college sports industry in general.  The remainder of this Section provides an 
analysis of the potential effect of the TCJA on the U.S. college sports arena. 
1. Charitable Contributions, Limitation on Deductions & Removal of Priority 
Seating 
Tax year 2018 sets the stage for taxpayers to elect significantly higher  
standard deduction amounts on their individual income tax returns.  The TCJA 
almost doubled the previous standard deductions available under I.R.C. Section 
63.146  Section 11021 of the TCJA now provides deduction amounts for tax years 
2018 through 2025 at $12,000 for individuals, $18,000 for heads of households, 
and $24,000 for married couples filing jointly.147  Following the implementation 
 
142. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 227; see also id. (noting that a major loophole that 
closed was the elimination of the 80/20 tax deduction for contributions made that included the right to athletic 
seating). 
143. Smith, supra note 140. 
144. New Tax Study Anticipates Significant Decrease in Charitable Giving Following Tax Reform, ASS’N 
FUNDRAISING PROFS. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://afpglobal.org/news/new-tax-study-anticipates-significant-de-
crease-charitable-giving-following-tax-reform. 
145. See Wolverton & Kambhampati, supra note 26 (documenting capital campaign donations made to 
college athletic departments); see also Crystal Christenson, Makes You Wonder Whether Congress Just 
Doesn’t Like College Sports, WIPFLI, https://www.wipfli.com/insights/articles/tax-makes-you-wonder-
whether-congress-just-doesnt-like-college-sports-180416 (last visited May 9, 2019) (inquiring into  
Congress’s decision to tax colleges sports).  
146. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 11021 (2017-2018); see also 26 U.S.C. § 26 (2019). 
147. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 11021. 
KISSKA-SCHULZE - ARTICLE 29.2 4/30/19  11:15 AM 
370 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:2 
of this law, Revenue Procedure 2018-18 officially amended I.R.C. Section 
63(c)(2) to reflect this new temporary increase.148   
For millions of taxpayers, the increased standard deduction will result in a 
meaningful decrease in the number of taxpayers who are eligible to itemize their 
deductions.149  Historically, U.S. tax law has encouraged Americans to engage 
in charitable giving by providing a federal tax deduction for donations made to 
programs generally unfunded by the government.150  As a taxpayer’s income 
increases, the out-of-pocket costs of charitable donations decreases.151   
Taxpayers who elect the standard deduction because they do not meet the  
required income or itemized deduction threshold receive no financial tax benefit 
from making charitable contributions.152   
Congressional motivation to introduce charitable deductions arose in the 
early part of the twentieth century following an anticipated decrease in  
donations from prosperous taxpayers during times of war.153  Officially inducted 
into the U.S. Tax Code in 1954, I.R.C. Section 170 provides a deduction for 
charitable contributions, subject to certain restrictions.154  Some critics suggest 
that charitable giving is not reliant on tax deductions.155  However, empirical 
evidence supports that the charitable giving of low- and middle-class taxpayers 
is affected by the price of giving, resulting in their being sensitive to tax  
incentives.156  It seems plausible that absent an available tax deduction,  
 
148. See I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2018-18 (2018).  Note that the standard deduction increase is scheduled to 
expire on December 31, 2025.  Id. 
149. See Gary Strauss, Higher Standard Deduction Means Fewer Taxpayers to Itemize, AARP (Jan. 22, 
2018), https://www.aarp.org/money/taxes/info-2018/new-standard-deduction-fd.html. 
150. Alyssa A. DiRusso, Charity at Work: Proposing a Charitable Flexible Spending Account, 2014 
UTAH L. REV. 281 (2014). 
151. Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of  
Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 330 (1997). 
152. DiRusso, supra note 150 (documenting a thorough history of I.R.C. Section 170 and U.S. charitable 
giving deductions). 
153. Id. at 289-91. 
154. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2019); see also id. at 323. 
155. See DiRusso, supra note 150, at 295 (citing to Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us 
About the Charitable Deduction, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 964-67 (2010); see also Bullock, supra note 151, 
at 339 (noting that critics suggest the charitable giving of low-and middle-class taxpayers is not affected by 
tax incentives). 
156. See Bullock, supra note 151, at 340 (citing to Michael J. Boskin & Martin Feldstein, Effects of 
Charitable Deduction on Contributions by Low Income and Middle Income Households: Evidence From the 
National Survey of Philanthropy, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 351-54 (1978); Eleanor Brown, Tax Incentives and 
Charitable Giving: Evidence from New Survey Data, 15 PUB. FIN. Q. 386-96 (1987); Jerald Schiff, Does 
Government Spending Crowd Out Charitable Contributions?, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 535-46 (1985); William A. 
Luksetich & Nasser Daneshvary, Prices of Giving, Income Sources and Declared Contributions (paper  
presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Associations and Voluntary 
Actions (ARNOVA), San Francisco, 1994)); see also DiRusso, supra note 150, at 342 (citing to David M. 
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taxpayers may be less incentivized to give generously under the  
newly-increased standard deduction amounts.157   
The standard deduction amounts pronounced in the TCJA serve to promote 
the philanthropy of wealthy individuals, while disincentivizing middle and 
lower class donations.158  The Tax Policy Center estimates that this change will 
result in itemized deductions for charitable contributions made to non-profit  
organizations to decrease from $37 million to $16 million in 2018.159  Although 
this change may not have directly targeted college sports, it could certainly  
present an indirect, negative impact.  In 2017, charitable donations made to U.S. 
colleges and universities rose 6%.160  Institutions of higher education raised 
$43.6 billion in 2017 alone.161  This amount served as the highest fundraising 
total recorded by colleges and universities in the past six years.162   
While the financial systems of college athletic departments are often  
separate and distinct from their universities’ academic programs, outside  
donations made to finance ungraded athletic facilities and student-athlete  
financial aid hit the billion dollar mark in 2015.163  Although alumni and booster 
donations account for the greatest portion of athletic budgets, one of the biggest 
challenges facing athletic program fundraising is increasing donor motivation, 
which is directly tied to access to priority seating at athletic events.164  The  
prevalence of this motivation is driven by the limited number of available tickets 
to select college sporting events like football and basketball, and the popularity 
 
Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public 
Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221 nn.101-02 (2009) (quoting Professor Schizer who finds that charitable deductions 
are necessary to “persuade donors to be more generous,” and that reducing tax benefits could cause donors to 
refuse “support even from programs they favor,” believing that funding will ultimately be borne by others)). 
157. Associated Press, Charitable Giving To Take a Hit From the Tax Law, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/charitable-giving-to-take-a-hit-from-the-tax-law/. 
158. Id. 
159. Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking Charitable Deductions Under the New 
Tax Law, FORBES, Jan. 11, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2018/01/11/21-million-taxpayers-
will-stop-taking-charitable-deductions-under-the-new-tax-law/#b25b2d4238f0. 
160. Heather Joslyn, Donations to Colleges Up 6% in 2017, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Donations-to-Colleges-Up-6-in/242441. 




163. See Yong Jae Ko et al., What Motivates Donors to Athletic Programs: A New Model of Donor  
Behavior, 43 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 523, 523 (2013); see also Wolverton & Kambhampati, 
supra note 26.  
164. See Ko et al., supra note 163 (noting the significance of alumni donations); see also James M.  
Gladden et al., Towards a Better Understanding of College Athletic Donors: What Are the Primary Motives?, 
14 SPORT MARKETING Q. 18, 19 (2005) (documenting the main challenges facing college athletic program 
fundraising). 
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of priority points programs at Division I schools.165  As such, college athletic 
programs will suffer not only from declining charitable donations due to the 
increased standard deductions, but also from the TCJA’s abolishment of the 
80% deduction previously allowed for amounts paid in exchange for college 
athletic seating rights.   
The TCJA effectively repealed the 80/20 rule which allowed donors to  
deduct 80% of their contributions paid in exchange for priority seating rights to 
college athletic events.166  As discussed previously, prior to this redaction the 
IRS allowed taxpayers who made payments to, or for the benefit of, colleges or 
universities and, as a result, received athletic event tickets in the athletic  
stadiums to deduct 80% of such payments as charitable contributions.167   
Effective January 1, 2018, taxpayers can no longer take the charitable deduction 
on 80% of any contribution tied to a right to purchase priority seating tickets at 
college sporting events.   
The loss of the 80/20 tax deduction could result in a decreased demand for 
college athletic season tickets, which would further result in decreased  
charitable donations.  In addition, the TCJA now bars employers from taking 
deductions for expenses relating to entertainment activities.168  Specifically, 
TCJA Section 13304 amends I.R.C. Section 274 by imposing limitations on  
deductions available to employers for expenses related to certain fringe  
benefits.169  Included in this amended Section is the removal of the allowance 
by employers to deduct the cost of tickets to sporting events purchased for the 
purpose of entertaining clients and business prospects.170  Prior to this law taking 
effect, employers were permitted to deduct 50% of various business  
entertainment expenses, including the price of event tickets.171  As a result,  
businesses may cease to offer entertainment options to clientele, which have 
historically included the purchase of seats in stadium suites.172  Although the 
Joint Committee on Taxation estimates this change in law will result in an  
increase of $23.5 billion in tax revenue, colleges and universities that include 
 
165. Gladden et al., supra note 164, at 27. 
166. 26 U.S.C. § 170(l) (2019). 
167. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 3 (2017). 
168. 26 U.S.C. § 274(a) (2019). 
169. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 13304 (2017-2018); see also 26 U.S.C. § 274.  
170. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 13304; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(b) (2018). 
171. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (2017). 
172. See Y. David Scharf, New Tax Law Is a Curveball for the Sports Industry, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 20, 
2018), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2018-02-20/new-tax-law-is-a-curve-
ball-for-the-sports-industry. 
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revenue streams from corporate suites as part of their overall budgets may suffer 
substantial revenue loss.173 
Moving forward, athletic departments will need to account for the financial 
impact of these changes in law, and will need to evaluate other motivational 
giving incentives outside the privilege of priority seating rights.174  Capitalizing 
on future efforts to better understand and influence donors’ emotional  
commitment to universities, athletic departments, teams, and select athletes will 
be an integral component to athletic departments’ ability to generate funds  
otherwise lost due to the enactment of the TCJA.  As tax benefits are cited as 
one of the top motivators influencing charitable gifting, athletic departments 
will now have to devise ways to expand their efforts to encourage alumni and 
booster donations absent the attraction of tangible benefits.175 
2. Excise Taxes on Executive Compensation and Investment Income 
Section 13602 of the TCJA adds a new I.R.C. Section 4960 to the Tax 
Code.176  This section requires that “applicable tax-exempt organizations” be 
subject to a 21% excise tax on payments of executive compensation deemed 
excessive under the new law’s provisions.177  Beginning after tax year 2017, 
organizations subject to this provision include those exempt from taxation under 
I.R.C. Section 501(a), including Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations.178  
As noted earlier, tax exempt organizations include colleges, universities, and 
university athletic programs.179  The new excise tax, payable by the  
organization, applies to the top five highest paid employees whose annual  




174. See Gladden et al., supra note 164, at 27 (noting the need to observe ways to motivate charitable 
donors). 
175. Allison Anna Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, 95 B.U.L. REV. 1663, 1701 n.242 
(2015) (citing tax incentives as one of the top three motivators for charitable giving). 
176. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 13602 (2017-2018); see also 26 U.S.C. § 4960 (2019).  
177. 26 U.S.C. § 4960(a). 
178. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 4960(c)(1). 
179. See Robert Lattinville & Roger Denny, How the New Excise Tax Impacts Coach Compensation, 
ADU, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/how-the-new-excise-tax-impacts-coach-compensation/ (last  
visited May 9, 2019). 
180. 26 U.S.C. § 4960(a)(1). 
181. Id. §§ 4960(a)(1), (c)(2); see also Lattinville & Denny, supra note 179 (defining excess parachute 
payments as “compensation paid upon the termination of the employee’s employment if the aggregate present 
value of such payment equals or exceeds three times the employee’s ‘base amount.’”). 
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Similar to the repeal of the 80/20 deduction discussed above, the new I.R.C. 
Section 4960 directly targets college athletic programs.  In 2006, forty-two  
college football coaches earned at least $1 million a year in salaries.182  Six years 
later, that same number of coaches earned at least $2 million in salaries.183  As 
of 2016, twenty college football coaching salaries topped the $4 million mark,184 
while the twenty-five highest paid college basketball coaches in the U.S. earned 
between $2 and $6 million per year.185  Data collected across all fifty states in 
2016 found that college football or men’s basketball coaches are the  
highest-paid public employees in thirty-nine states.186  In all, there are  
approximately 240 NCAA Division I coaches and athletic directors earning 
more than $1 million.187  Implementing a 21% excise tax on top of these salaries 
will require universities to pay millions of additional dollars in taxes beginning 
in 2018. 
Moving forward, universities with limited resources may have to consider 
capping coaches’ compensation at $1 million.188  To survive the continued 
“arms race” of increasing coaching salaries, more lucrative universities may 
have to simply re-budget for the additional taxes, or instead devise creative pay 
schemes to offset the impact of the tax.  One possibility is to allow coaching 
staff to enter into direct sponsorship agreements with outside vendors to  
enhance lower salaries paid by universities.189  Another option includes  
supplementing a portion of coaches’ salaries with more impressive employee 
compensation and benefits packages that may include more significant life  
insurance options, retirement plan contributions, and deferred compensation.190   
 




184. See College Football Coaches Who Make More Than $4 Million, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2016, 
https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/sports/ncaaf/2016/10/26/college-football-coaches-who-make-
more-than-4-million/92508490/. 
185. Id.; see also Laura McKenna, Why College Basketball Coaches Make Such High Salaries, 
ATLANTIC, Mar. 24, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/03/the-madness-of-college-
basketball-coaches-salaries/475146/. 
186. Evan Comen et al., The Highest Paid Public Employee in Every State, 24/7 WALL ST. (Sept. 20, 
2016), https://247wallst.com/special-report/2016/09/20/the-highest-paid-public-employee-in-every-state/. 
187. Lattinville & Denny, supra note 179. 
188. Id. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. 
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Initial estimates speculate that the new excise tax on coaching salaries will 
increase government revenue by $1.7 billion.191  However, the financial impact 
that universities will ultimately suffer due to this new Code section will require 
a reevaluation by universities of their college athletic programs’ budgets,  
particularly in conjunction with the anticipated loss in revenue from charitable 
donations. The House Ways and Means Committee projects that the removal of 
the 80/20 deduction will net an additional $200 million to the government  
annually.192  While it may prove lucrative to the federal government, the  
combination of I.R.C. Sections 4960 and 170(l) pose direct threats to college 
athletic programs’ bottom lines. 
In addition, the TCJA introduced a new 1.4% excise tax on the investment 
income of qualifying private colleges and universities beginning after December 
31, 2017.193  This provision applies to eligible private educational institutions 
that enrolled at least 500 students during the previous tax year, more than 50% 
of whom were in the U.S., and at least $500,000 in aggregate fair market value 
of assets per student.194  Dubbed the “Harvard tax,” state colleges and  
universities are unaffected by this new tax.195 
While the Harvard tax does not have a direct impact on college sports, it 
could result in at least twenty seven private colleges and universities, including 
Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, having millions of dollars less in funds to spend 
on students and student-athletes.196  The Ivy League in NCAA Division I sports 
boasts more than 8,000 student-athletes competing each year.197  In recent years, 
the Ivy League has increased commercialized branding and high-income  
 
191. David Cloninger & Grace Raynor, Tax Reform Law Has College Administrators, South Carolina 
and Clemson Fans Wondering What’s Next, POST & COURIER, Jan. 14, 2018, https://www.postand-
courier.com/sports/tax-reform-law-has-college-administrators-south-carolina-and-clemson/arti-
cle_9b344f5a-f6f1-11e7-83e7-3fb6abc825cb.html. 
192. Smith, supra note 140. 
193. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 13704(b) (2017-2018); see also 26 U.S.C. § 4968 (2019).   
194. 26 U.S.C. § 4968(b)(1). 
195. See New Excise Tax on College and University Net Investment Income – What Your Institution Needs 
to Know, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publica-
tions/insights/assets/pwc-new-excise-tax-on-college-and-university-net-investment-income.pdf (noting that 
public institutions are not impacted by this tax); see also J. Calvin Marks, Excise Tax on University  
Endowments, JOHNSON LAMBERT LLP (Mar. 2018), https://www.johnsonlambert.com/post/excise-tax-on-
university-endowments/ (referencing this new tax as being the “Harvard tax”). 
196. See Matthew Sussis, Hit to Leading Universities From New Tax May Be In Tens of Millions of 
Dollars, MARKET WATCH (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/hit-to-leading-universities-
from-new-tax-may-be-in-tens-of-millions-of-dollars-2018-01-16. 
197. About the Ivy League, IVY LEAGUE, 
http://ivyleague.com/sports/2017/8/13/HISTORY_0813173057.aspx (last visited May 9, 2019). 
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revenue streams to help fund athletic programs.198  Currently, Harvard ranks 
first in Division I sports for hosting the greatest number of athletic programs in 
the country, while providing more financial aid to students than any other  
institution in the U.S.199  In 2014, Yale spent almost $38 million on athletics, 
representing the second highest figure in the Ivy League athletic spending that 
year.200  Certainly, the new excise tax could have an indirect impact on the  
internal finances available to the Ivy League athletic programs. 
The imposition of I.R.C. Section 4986 was met with immediate and heavy 
criticism.  Cornell University President Martha Pollak claimed the estimated tax 
cost to the University will be $10.5 million annually, noting that the tax will 
require “less money to spend on institutional aid, research, new libraries and 
other campus buildings and facilities.”201  Harvard President Drew Faust  
declared “the new endowment tax represents an unprecedented attack on the 
tax-exempt status of nonprofits and charities because it taxes, for the first time, 
income from such an institution’s core mission – in this case, education.”202  
Vanderbilt University Chancellor Nicholas Zeppos, along with forty eight  
colleagues, has directly requested that Congress modify or eliminate the tax, 
noting “this legislation . . . needlessly undercuts the resources universities need 
to operate . . . .”203   
Although the newly-imposed 21% excise tax on coaching salaries may not 
affect the Ivy League, as compared to other NCAA Division I leagues, the 1.4% 
excise tax on private colleges and universities could have a significant impact 
on the financial capabilities of the Ivy League athletic programs moving  
 
198. Henry Zhu, A New Commercial Age in the Ivy League, HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/column/kazhu-kid/article/2018/4/4/column-april3-hz-ivyleague/. 
199. Harvard Football at a Glance, HARV., https://www.gocrimson.com/sports/fball/Program_Infor-
mation/Harvard_Football_at_a_Glance (last visited May 9, 2019). 
200. Greg Cameron, Breaking Down Yale Athletics’ Budget, YALE NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2015/02/04/breaking-down-yale-athletics-budget/ (the highest expenses paid 
that year came from the University of Pennsylvania, which reportedly spent $28,627,930 in 2014). 
201. Anne Delwiche & Alisha Gupta, Pollak Slams GOP Tax Plan, Says It Would Cost Cornell Millions, 
CORNELL DAILY SUN, Nov. 9, 2017, http://cornellsun.com/2017/11/09/pollack-slams-gop-tax-plan-says-it-
would-cost-cornell-millions/. 
202. Alvin Powell, Harvard President Voices Concern After Endowment Tax Passes, HARV. GAZETTE 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/12/harvard-president-voices-concern-after-en-
dowment-tax-passes/. 
203. Chancellor Zeppos Weighs In on the Tax Cut and Jobs Act, VAND. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2017/11/09/statement-by-vanderbilt-university-chancellor-on-the-tax-cut-and-
jobs-act/.  The Treasury subsequently issued Notice 2018-55, stating a plan to issue proposed regulations 
limiting the impact of the new tax on private college and university endowments.  See Guidance on the  
Calculation of Net Investment Income for Purposes of the Section 4968 Excise Tax Applicable to Certain 
Private Colleges and Universities, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-18-55.pdf (last visited May 9, 
2019) (Notice 2018-55).  
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forward.204  Under this new law, alumni donations may decrease due to concerns 
that their charitable giving would go into the hands of the federal government 
rather than the institutions they support.205  With less money available for  
scholarships to students and funding of facilities, Ivy League athletic  
departments may be at a financial risk in the future, requiring that programs look 
to further their commercialized opportunities with third party vendors in order 
to help fund their sports programs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although many of the key elements of the TCJA’s overall tax overhaul did 
not address college athletics, at the onset of 2018 U.S. institutions of higher 
education are finding themselves examining the financial impact that the law 
will have on their bottom lines, to include continued funding of their sports  
programs.  Embedded within the core of the TCJA, collegiate amateur  
athletics—both directly and indirectly—were targeted by Congress for the first 
time in recent history for tax purposes. 
Prior to January 1, 2018, the college athletics industry enjoyed favorable 
federal tax treatment, with Congress declaring the fostering of amateur athletics 
as being a charitable purpose.206  Similarly, the IRS has thus far been  
disinterested in taxing student-athletes on their athletic scholarships.207   
However, the new tax provisions entrenched in the TCJA now require that both 
public and private colleges and universities, along with their affiliated athletic 
departments, prepare for the imminent financial impact.   
Thus far, little guidance from the Treasury has been issued with respect to 
the application of the TCJA.208  Requests for guidance from trade groups across 
the U.S. industry have already begun.209  Because the Treasury has now issued 
 
204. See Leonard Dozier, Salary of An Ivy League Basketball Coach, CAREER TREND (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://careertrend.com/salary-of-an-ivy-league-basketball-coach-12598435.html (noting that the  
average salary of Ivy League head basketball coaches is $81,788); see also Ashley McDonnell & Jake Comer, 
Brown Head Coaches Paid 22 Percent Less Than League Average, BROWN DAILY HERALD, Apr. 12, 2011, 
http://www.browndailyherald.com/2011/04/12/brown-head-coaches-paid-22-percent-less-than-league-aver-
age/ (documenting that Cornell University’s head football coach is the highest paid in the Ivy League at 
$91,368). 
205. See Delwiche & Gupta, supra note 201. 
206. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1730 (1976) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2017)).   
207. See Randall, supra note 11, at 299; see also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 11, at 250. 
208. See Robert Sledz, U.S. Treasury Official Provides Update on TCJA Guidance at 2018 OECD  
Conference, THOMSON REUTERS (June 20, 2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/u-s-treasury-official-
provides-update-on-tcja-guidance-at-2018-oecd-conference/. 
209. See, e.g., Request for Immediate Guidance Regarding IRC Section 199A – Deduction for Qualified 
Business Income of Pass-Through Entities (Pub. L. No. 115-97, Sec. 11011), supra note 4; Thomas P. Nickels, 
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Notice 2018-43, which invites public recommendations for consideration in the 
2018-19 Priority Guidance Plan, it is important that institutions of higher  
education and their athletic programs boisterously participate in this  
discussion.210  History shows that the immediate backlash by colleges and  
universities following the IRS’s issuance of Revenue Ruling 84-132, which  
denied taxpayers the right to deduct any part of their donations to university 
athletic programs which also included a right to purchase priority seating,  
ultimately prompted Congress to pass the Technical and Miscellaneous  
Revenue Act of 1988, which allowed for the 80/20 charitable tax deduction.211  
Less than a decade letter, immense objections by university systems to the IRS’s 
imposition of a UBI tax on corporate sponsorship payments in exchange for 
naming rights to bowl games compelled Congress to issue proposed regulations 
overturning the IRS’s position.212  As Lindsey Graham, Senator of South  
Carolina and home of the 2017 and 2019 National Championship Clemson  
football team, noted in his early efforts to thwart the repeal of the 80/20  
deduction as implemented into the TCJA, “You mess with college football, 
you’re going to get creamed.”213  It is imperative that colleges and universities 
begin to proactively engage with Congress to discuss the elimination or  
modification of the applicable sections of the TCJA in order to reduce the  
negative financial impact that this law will have on college sports moving  
forward. 
In the interim, university athletic departments must aggressively begin  
accounting for the financial effects that the TCJA will have on their programs; 
capitalize on new and continued efforts to influence alumni and booster  
commitments to their universities, athletic departments, college teams, and  
student-athletes; expand efforts to encourage future donations without the  
attraction of tangible benefits like rights to priority seating and corporate suites; 
and consider entertaining additional third-party commercialized opportunities 
in order to fund their sports programs.  In conjunction, some universities may 
need to re-evaluate their salary negotiations with college coaches and  
investigate innovative options for supplementing escalating salaries.  The TCJA 
 
Request for Guidance on Questions Raised by New Tax Law, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-05/180501-cl-aha-office-tax-policy.pdf; U.S. Chamber of Comments 
Regarding Regulatory Guidance Under Public Law No. 115-97, supra note 4. 
210. Public Comment Invited on Recommendations for 2018-2019 Priority Guidance Plan, supra note 5.  
211. H.R. 433, 100th Cong. § 6001(a) (1988).  
212. Musselman, supra note 110, at 208.  
213. See Brian Murphy, College Football: Lindsey Graham Seeks to Save Tax Deduction, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, Nov. 30. 2017, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-
blogs/under-the-dome/article187347008.html. 
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is here to stay—at least for now— and colleges and universities need to prepare 
for the immediate and long-term effects. 
 
